Local knowledge of emerging hazards : Instability above an Icelandic glacier by Matti, Stephanie Alice & Ögmundardóttir, Helga
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 58 (2021) 102187
Available online 18 March 2021
2212-4209/© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Local knowledge of emerging hazards: Instability above an Icelandic glacier 
Stephanie Matti *, Helga Ögmundardóttir 
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A B S T R A C T   
Climate change is contributing to shifts in the magnitude and scale of hazards, and the emergence of risks in 
areas where they were previously unknown. In south-east Iceland, a fracture in the mountainside of Svínafell-
sheiði threatens to cause between 60 and 100 million cubic metres of rock to fall onto the glacier below. A large 
landslide could break up the surface of the glacier, crash into the proglacial lake, and affect people and infra-
structure downhill. In addition to the unprecedented scale, the Svínafellsheiði fracture represents the first time 
people and infrastructure have been exposed to this type of hazard in Iceland. In this article we examine the role 
of local knowledge in disaster risk reduction and management for communities that are facing a particular type 
of hazard for the first time. We argue that even when a community lacks experience with a specific type of 
hazard, local knowledge can still play a valuable role in hazard identification and risk management.   
1. Introduction 
In 2014, local farmers gathering sheep on the slopes above Svína-
fellsjökull outlet glacier in south-east Iceland discovered a fracture in the 
mountainside. It appeared to be 100 m long, and close to a cliff-edge that 
rises 400 m vertically above the glacier. The farmers monitored the 
fracture and made some basic measurements, before bringing it to the 
attention of scientists and disaster management authorities. The fracture 
is now understood to be 1.7 km long with approximately 60 million 
cubic metres of rock in motion [1; see Fig. 1]. If the entire section of the 
cliff collapses at once onto the glacier it may cause no further damage, 
however, a large landslide could break up the surface of the glacier, 
crash into the proglacial lake,1 and cause a “fast-flowing slurry of rock, 
ice, water and even air” that could affect people and infrastructure 
downhill [2]. At the time of writing, the fracture was widening, and 
there was a high degree of uncertainty about the timing and ultimate 
form the large landslide would take. 
Icelandic people have a long history of managing environmental 
risks including volcanic eruptions, glacial floods, surging glaciers and 
extreme weather. This has fostered traditions of local risk knowledge, 
and driven the development of advanced monitoring and warning sys-
tems, and disaster management protocols that have reduced casualty 
rates to almost zero [3]. However, large landslides onto gla-
ciers—defined as landslides with a volume of more than one million 
cubic metres [4]—represent a relatively unknown hazard in Iceland. 
There is no record of a large landslide onto a glacier affecting people or 
infrastructure since the country was first settled in the 9th century. The 
massive scale of the Svínafellsheiði fracture also singles it out as unique 
in Icelandic history, with scientists predicting that it may result in “one 
of the largest mass movements in Iceland during the Holocene” [1]. 
There is broad consensus in the disaster risk reduction and man-
agement (DRRM) literature that local knowledge is a critical element of 
the coping capacity of local communities [5–7]. This local knowledge is 
often portrayed as being deeply rooted in a people’s historic experience 
of similar hazards. Dominey-Howes and Minos-Minopoulos, for 
example, suggest that the “inherited memory” of a hazardous event is “a 
vital element of community resilience.” [70]; 306) However, the IPCC 
has established that extreme events, which trigger disasters are 
increasingly likely to occur in places they were previously unknown due 
to climate change [8]. The role of local knowledge in DRRM for com-
munities that are facing a particular type of hazard for the first time 
represents a gap in the literature that this study addresses, drawing on 
the case of the Svínafellsheiði fracture. In this article we argue that even 
when a community lacks experience with a specific type of hazard, local 
knowledge can still play an important role in DRRM, especially in the 
identification of hazards. However, when it comes to predicting the 
impact and suggesting survival strategies for new hazards, local 
knowledge plays a more varied role. 
This article is structured as follows. The next section discusses the 
research design including literature review, study area, and 
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methodology. Section 3 outlines the main natural hazards in the area. 
Section 4 examines local knowledge in the area as it relates to large 
landslides onto glaciers, and how this has been incorporated into DRRM 
processes. We conclude the findings in Section 5. 
2. Research design 
2.1. Literature review 
In recent decades, DRRM scholarship and practice has embraced an 
increasingly holistic view of hazard risks, taking into account the resil-
ience and underlying vulnerabilities of people living in exposed areas. 
Local and indigenous knowledge systems, defined by UNESCO as the 
“understandings, skills and philosophies developed by societies with 
long histories of interaction with their natural surroundings,” are un-
derstood to play a critical role in improving the resilience of commu-
nities [76: 3]. Many terms have been used in the literature to refer to 
local knowledge, including indigenous knowledge, traditional knowl-
edge, traditional ecological knowledge and folk knowledge [9]. These 
terms differ somewhat in terms of reference group and connotations but 
maintain significant cross-over in meaning. In this article, the term ‘local 
knowledge’ is preferred over ‘indigenous’ or ‘traditional knowledge’ as 
it avoids the static connotations associated with ‘traditional knowledge’, 
and has a broader scope that encompasses both indigenous and 
non-indigenous local knowledge [9,10]. 
Local knowledge is acquired by people through long-term local-scale 
observations, including about the environment, natural hazards and the 
weather [11,12]. Local knowledge is typically accrued from generation 
to generation, and tested over long periods of time [9]. This knowledge 
becomes embedded in practices, institutions, and rituals within the 
community [13,14]. While often depicted as static and hermetically 
sealed, recent scholarship has emphasised that local knowledge systems 
are complex, porous, dynamic, and constantly updated [15]. 
Since the 1990s, the endeavour to integrate local knowledge into the 
study and practice of DRRM has gained momentum [11,12,16–18]. 
Local knowledge is now understood to play an important role in DRRM, 
including helping communities develop resilience by: identifying signs 
that trigger early response; anticipating potential hazards intensified by 
climate change; becoming empowered in the implementation of DRRM 
activities; and improving recovery from the effects of disasters [5–7]. 
The importance of local knowledge in DRRM is recognised under the 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2030), which calls 
on countries to complement scientific knowledge with local knowledge 
when developing and implementing DRRM strategies and policies [18]. 
A rich case study literature examines how communities have 
employed local knowledge to improve DRRM for a wide variety of 
hazards, including floods in China [19] and Zimbabwe [20], rock-ice 
avalanches in Peru [21], earthquakes in India/Pakistan [22], and trop-
ical cyclones in Fiji and Tonga [23] to name but a few. While studies 
dealing with local knowledge and DRRM typically focus on developing 
countries, some studies point to the important but less well-understood 
role of local knowledge in developed countries such as Scotland, Finland 
[24], and other European countries [25]. A complementary body of 
scholarship examines the long-term transfer of hazard knowledge in 
Europe including in relation to flood practices in Germany [26], land-
slides and flood prevention in Italy [27], floods across Europe [28], and 
traditional disaster memory in Switzerland [29]. 
In the Icelandic context, several studies have examined local 
knowledge and DRRM practices in relation to Katla and Eyjafjallajökull, 
two volcanoes in southern Iceland [30–33]. Research into the rich local 
knowledge and folklore of the area has captured stories of the origin of 
Katla and predictions of future flood paths, as well as recollections of 
heroic escapes and ineffective responses [30,32,34] . Bird et al. assessed 
resident knowledge, behaviour and perceptions of risk relating to Katla 
[31], while subsequent research highlighted how inherited local 
knowledge has increased the resilience of inhabitants in the area [32]. 
This article adds to this body of research on the intersection of local 
knowledge and DRRM processes in developed countries, and sheds 
further light on landslide DRRM practices in Iceland. 
In the literature, local knowledge is often portrayed as being rooted 
in people’s historic experience of similar hazards [35]. For example, 
Iloka explains that local knowledge “has been gathered by ancestors 
who have experienced and recovered from the impacts of hazards and 
disasters, who then pass the knowledge down to their children.” [72] : 
30] Dominey-Howes and Minos-Minopoulos suggest that “inherited 
memory” of a hazardous event is “a vital element of community resil-
ience.” (2004, p. 306) The role of local knowledge in communities that 
are facing a particular type of hazard for the first time represents a gap in 
the literature that this study aims to address. Gaillard and Mercer argue 
that “local people and communities are not helpless in the face of natural 
Fig. 1. Scientific monitoring visit to the fracture in August 2019. The fracture is visible on the surface as a trench, starting from the bottom right corner of the 
photograph and extending downhill. 
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hazards” and that “local knowledge is a valuable resource” [71]: 94]. We 
argue that even in cases where a community has an almost total lack of 
experience with a particular type of hazard, local knowledge can still be 
a valuable resource in identifying hazards and building resilience. 
2.2. Study area 
Located at the confluence of the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, 
Iceland is prone to a multitude of hazards including extreme storms, 
floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides, and avalanches. This 
study was conducted in the Öræfi district of south-eastern Iceland with a 
specific focus on the two hamlets exposed to the Svínafellsheiði fracture: 
Freysnes and Svínafell. The seven settlements of the district are spread 
around the base of Öræfajökull—a large ice-capped strato-
volcano—separated by a series of steep outlet glaciers and their melt-
water rivers. Sigurmundsson et al. have established that the district is 
one of the most vulnerable areas to glacier floods, volcanic eruptions and 
climate change in Iceland [74]. Öræfi had a permanent population of 
151 people in 2018 [37], however, the number of people living and 
working in the area on a temporary or seasonal basis is much higher. 
Freysnes is located 800 m beyond the terminus of the Svínafellsjökull 
outlet glacier while Svínafell lies approximately 2 km further south-east 
(see Fig. 2). In 2018, Freysnes consisted of 17 buildings including a 
hotel, farm, petrol station and several houses; it is also traversed by the 
country’s main highway, locally known as the Ring Road (see Fig. 3). 
Svínafell consisted of 21 buildings including two farms, three guest-
houses, a campground and several residential buildings. In recent de-
cades, the district has shifted from a dependence on sheep farming to 
large-scale tourism including glacier walks on Svínafellsjökull. This 
has been part of a larger trend that has seen tourism in Iceland rise from 
448,000 foreign visitors in 2010 to over 2.2 million in 2018 [38]. 
Many of the local inhabitants in Freysnes and Svínafell come from 
families that have lived in the district for generations, with some tracing 
their history back to 1300 AD. Both Freysnes and Svínafell are 
mentioned in early Icelandic literature, suggesting that they date from at 
least as early as 1000 AD [39]. Svínafell, for example, is mentioned in 
Njáls Saga: “Flosi dwelt at Swinefell, and was a mighty chief” [40 : 
Ch.94]. Iceland generally has a rich literary tradition of documenting 
events that started soon after the country was first settled. This has 
resulted in a wealth of detailed observations about the landscape, 
weather phenomena, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, avalanches and 
other natural events [41]. 
3. Methods 
The purpose of this study was to examine the role of local knowledge 
in the identification and management of the Svínafellsheiði fracture. 
This article presents the findings of an ethnographic study that used 
mixed methods, including participant observation, semi-structured in-
terviews and open discussions, to review existing local knowledge as it 
applied to the Svínafellsheiði fracture and DRRM processes. This differs 
from a citizen science approach, in which inhabitants are directly 
engaged through the research process to gather data and develop 
knowledge to advance scientific inquiry [42]. The research was under-
taken between August 2018 and November 2020 in Iceland. 
A series of 53 semi-structured face-to-face interviews were con-
ducted with 15 local inhabitants, nine glacier guides, eight foreign in-
habitants, eight tourists, three DRRM experts, two scientists, two 
tourism experts, two search and rescue coordinators, and one national 
park ranger (see Table 1). Several local inhabitants were interviewed 
multiple times. Most people were interviewed individually, however 
five interviews were conducted with couples and one interview was 
conducted with a group of four local women together. Of the partici-
pants, 23 were female and 27 were male; all were aged between 20 and 
75 years old. All interviews were conducted in English except one, which 
was conducted in Icelandic with the assistance of an interpreter. The 
proficiency of local inhabitants with English reflects the important role 
of tourism in the local economy. Participants were identified through 
snowball sampling. This was effective given the relatively small number 
of people exposed to the hazard [43]. 
Each interview typically lasted between one and one-and-a-half 
hours, and covered the interviewees’ understanding of hazards in the 
area, local knowledge and practices, and their awareness of and 
involvement in DRRM processes. The questions were open-ended to 
allow important issues, perceptions and ideas to be raised and discussed. 
All interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed by the authors, and 
analysed together with field notes using QSR NVivo 12® (qualitative 
data analysis software). A bottom-up inductive analytical approach was 
taken to allow sub-themes and commonly held views to emerge from the 
data [44]. An advantage of this approach was that it gave voice to the 
experiences of local people [45]. In this paper, the interviews are 
referenced using the coding system presented in Table 1, which draws 
attention the role of the person interviewed. 
In addition to semi-structured interviews, the first author actively 
conducted research while living in the community and working as a 
glacier guide from April till October 2019. This intensive and long-term 
involvement helped rule out spurious associations and enabled the au-
thors to develop a deeper understanding of the topic [46]. Twelve 
additional trips to the study site were undertaken to participate in spe-
cific events relevant to the research including scientific monitoring 
missions (October 2018 and August 2019; see Fig. 1), formal public risk 
briefings (October 2018 and November 2020; see Fig. 6), and to assist 
gathering sheep on Svínafellsheiði (August 2020; see Fig. 5). Triangu-
lation of the results reduced the chance of systematic bias and limita-
tions associated with using a single data source [46]. In addition, the 
research findings were reviewed by several respondents including local 
inhabitants, scientists and risk managers, who provided feedback, and 
validated the results [46]. 
4. Hazards in the Öræfi district 
4.1. Large landslides onto glaciers 
The fracture in Svínafellsheiði is estimated to be 1.7 km in length 
with 60 million cubic metres of rock in motion [1; see Fig. 1]. If it col-
lapses, 60 to 100 million cubic metres of rock and debris are predicted to 
fall onto the surface of the glacier approximately 400 m below [1,2]. A 
large landslide could break up the surface of the glacier, cause a tsunami 
in the proglacial lake, and affect the downhill settlements of Freysnes 
and Svínafell [2]. Scientific research presented at public scientific 
briefings suggest that the entire mass will release as a single landslide 
rather than several smaller slides, increasing the risk for downhill set-
tlements (attended by first author, October 24, 2018). 
DRRM of the fracture is coordinated by local police with the support 
of Civil Protection. Public briefings about the fracture are conducted on 
a roughly annual basis or when new findings become available. A green 
alert has been in place for the hazard since October 2018.2 Risk man-
agement activities have focused on scientific monitoring, assessing the 
fracture, public information and reducing exposure. On June 22, 2018, 
local police together with Civil Protection issued an advisory: 
WARNING: Civil Protection advises against travel on Svínafellsjökull 
due to landslide danger. In particular, guided tours on the glacier are 
discouraged. Travelers are advised to stop only for a short while at 
viewpoints by the glacier tongue [47]. 
In early 2019, large warning signs were erected on the main roads 
leading to Svínafellsjökull, warning people about the hazard [see Fig. 4]. 
2 Civil Protection classifies hazards as uncertainty phase (green alert), alert 
phase (yellow alert), and emergency/distress phase (red alert). 
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While outlet glaciers in the Öræfi district have been retreating since 
the end of the Little Ice Age in 1890, the rate of retreat has accelerated 
significantly since 2000 [48]. Hannesdóttir and Baldursson established 
that in the period since 2000, the mass loss per unit area of glaciers in 
south-east Iceland has been among the highest in the world [48]. From 
1890 to 2010, Svínafellsjökull retreated approximately 800 m and 
Fig. 2. Location of the Öræfi district [77].  
Fig. 3. Location of Freysnes and Svínafell settlements in relation to Svínafellsheiði fracture. Base map: map.is.  
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decreased in volume by 30 % [49]. The IPCC confirmed that climate 
change has played, and continues to play, a major role in the retreat of 
Icelandic glaciers [16]. As glaciers thin and recede, slopes that were 
previously buttressed by larger volumes of ice become unstable [50,51]. 
In Iceland and worldwide, landslides in recently deglaciated areas are 
predicted to become more frequent due to glacial retreat, heat waves, 
permafrost degradation, changes in precipitation and the expansion of 
glacial lakes [52–55] 
Large landslides onto glaciers are rare in Iceland with only four 
recorded between 1950 and 2018; there is no record of this type of 
hazard affecting people or infrastructure [2,52,56,57]. The largest of 
these landslides occurred in 1967 when 15 million cubic metres of rock 
fell onto Steinsholtsjökull outlet glacier, north of the Eyjafjallajökull 
icecap. While less than half the debris was deposited on the glacier, it 
was enough to send a huge mass of air, ice, and water into the proglacial 
lake causing a wave 75 m high [52,58]. Two other large landslides took 
place in the Öræfi district: 4.5 million cubic metres fell on Morsárjökull 
in March 2007; and 5.4 million cubic metres fell on Svínafellsjökull, 
close to the current fracture, in February 2013 [2,56,57]. Based on 
current research, if the Svínafellsheiði fracture collapses in a single 
event, the mass movement would be between four and seven times as 
large as that on Steinsholtsjökull. In addition to the unprecedented scale, 
the Svínafellsheiði fracture represents the first time people and infra-
structure have been exposed to this type of hazard in Iceland, and the 
first time a large landslide onto a glacier has been identified and the risk 
managed in advance [59]. These factors single it out as a new type of 
hazard in Öræfi and in Iceland more generally. 
Areas exposed to the Svínafellsheiði fracture include the proglacial 
lake, glacier viewing area, terminal moraine, and areas behind the ter-
minal moraine including Freysnes and two farms in Svínafell (formal 
public briefing attended by first author, October 24, 2018). In June 
2018, an estimated 1500 people spent some period of time in the 
Table 1 
Interviews.  
Code Role Location Date 
RM.1. Risk manager Reykjavík 06-Oct-18 
RM.2. Risk manager Reykjavík 22-Oct-18 
RM.3. Risk manager Reykjavík 14-Dec-18 
RM.4. Risk manager Öræfi 24-Oct-18 
GG.1. Glacier guide Öræfi 18-Oct-18 
GG.2. Glacier guide Reykjavík 19-Oct-18 
GG.3. Glacier guide Reykjavík 30-Oct-18 
GG.4. Glacier guide Reykjavík 23-Nov-19 
GG.5. Glacier guide Reykjavík 25-Nov-19 
GG.6. Glacier guide Öræfi 26-Nov-19 
GG.7. Glacier guide Öræfi 27-Nov-19 
GG.8–9. Glacier guide Öræfi 28-Nov-19 
FI.1. Foreign inhabitant Reykjavík 24-Nov-19 
FI.2. Foreign inhabitant Öræfi 26-Nov-19 
FI.3–7. Foreign inhabitant Öræfi 27-Nov-19 
FI.8. Foreign inhabitant Öræfi 23-Oct-18 
LI.1. Local inhabitant Öræfi 16-Jul-19 
LI.2. Local inhabitant Öræfi 17-Jul-19 
LI.3. Local inhabitant Öræfi 27-Nov-19 
LI.4. Local inhabitant Öræfi 26-Nov-19 
LI.5–6. Local inhabitant Öræfi 27-Nov-19 
LI.7–8. Local inhabitant Öræfi 24-Oct-18 
LI.9. Local inhabitant Öræfi 25-Oct-18 
LI.10. Local inhabitants (x4) Öræfi 27-Oct-20 
LI.11. Local inhabitants (x2) Öræfi 28-Jun-20 
LI.12–13. Local inhabitant Öræfi 28-Jun-20 
LI.14. Local inhabitant Öræfi 29-Jun-20 
LI.15. Local inhabitant (in Icelandic) Öræfi 29-Jun-20 
S.1. Scientist Reykjavík 27-Sep-18 
S.2. Scientist Reykjavík 04-Oct-18 
S.3. Scientist Reykjavík 01-May-19 
S.4. Scientist Reykjavík 13-Nov-18 
T.1 - 8 Tourist Öræfi 28-Nov-19 
TE.1. Tourism expert Höfn 17-Oct-18 
TE.2. Tourism expert Öræfi 26-Nov-19 
NP.1. National parks Reykjavik 14-Dec-18 
SAR.1. Search and Rescue Reykjavik 29-Jan-19 
TE.1. Tourism expert Höfn 17-Oct-18 
TE.2. Tourism expert Öræfi 26-Nov-19 
NP.1. National parks Reykjavik 14-Dec-18 
SAR.1. Search and Rescue coordinators (x2) Reykjavik 29-Jan-19  
Fig. 4. Warning signs on access roads to Svínafellsjökull.  
Fig. 5. Local inhabitants gathering sheep on Svínafellsheiði.  
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exposed area on an average day, this included local and non-local in-
habitants, tourists, glacier guides and people driving on the road.3 
4.2. Other hazards 
Other hazards in the area have had a significant impact on the local 
environmental and the risk knowledge of inhabitants. In 1362, 
Öræfajökull erupted in what is considered the most powerful volcanic 
eruption in Iceland during historic times [60]. The eruption sent torrents 
of hot mud and water down outlet glaciers, destroying several settle-
ments and depositing an estimated one billion cubic metres of volcanic 
ash across the surrounding area [39]. The annals of Oddi recorded in 
1580 explain that “no living creature survived except one old woman 
and a mare.” [61 : 489]. 
Although the next—and most recent—eruption of Öræfajökull in 
1727 was smaller, eyewitness accounts still describe how the “glacier 
grew higher and swelled out one moment and then collapsed and sank 
inwards the next”, the following day there were earthquakes and a 
“horrifying cracking sound as loud as thunder” [62 : 224-225]. These 
were followed by the eruption and glacial floods that “slewed down onto 
the lowland, like molten metal poured out of a melting-pot.’” [62 : 
224-225]. More detailed accounts are provided of survival strategies 
from the 1727 floods including that “people saved themselves by getting 
on the tops of the houses” [63 : 14]. In July 2018, the Icelandic Mete-
orological Office announced that Öræfajökull was showing “clear signs 
of unrest” [56]; a year later the warning had been downgraded to 
normal levels. 
Approximately 50 km north-east of Freysnes, the Grímsvötn volcano 
lies beneath 700 m of icecap. The most active volcano in Iceland, 
Grímsvötn typically erupts every ten years, sending glacial floods down 
the Skeiðarárjökull outlet glacier, 10 km east of Freysnes [64]. 
Historically, crossing glacial rivers in Öræfi was often treacherous. 
However, this hazard has faded since the construction of a bridge over 
Skeiðará river in 1974. Another hazard emerged during the Little Ice Age 
(1500–1890) as advancing glaciers engulfed several farms in the area; 
with glaciers in retreat, this no longer represents a threat. Snow ava-
lanches are common in other regions of Iceland but have only caused 
damage or deaths in two sites in Öræfi since settlement [65]. Finally, the 
Öræfi district is prone to violent storms and hurricane-force winds 
especially in the winter months. 
5. Results and discussion 
This section presents the results of our research and discusses the 
findings. The first sub-section explores how knowledge of the land has 
been fostered through traditional sheep gathering practices, and how 
this led to the discovery of the fracture. The following sub-sections un-
pack the role of local knowledge in different aspects of DRRM including: 
understanding warning signs, predicting potential impact, planning 
response strategies, and participating in formal DRRM processes. Com-
parisons are made to local knowledge of other hazards in the area 
especially glacial flooding triggered by Grímsvötn. The findings are 
based on informal discussions, semi-structured interviews, study trips to 
the field site, and firsthand experience of the public risk briefings. In 
contrast to the area around Katla, the few mythical folklore stories told 
in Öræfi did not cover natural hazards. 
5.1. Sheep gathering and knowledge of the land 
Every year, sheep across Iceland are released to lowland pastures, 
common highland pastures and mountains to graze for the summer 
months. Then in the autumn, farmers scale the mountains, cross valleys 
and sweep through the lowlands gathering sheep and rounding them 
into communal pens. Sheep gathering has a long history in Iceland with 
written descriptions dating back to 1220 (Ref. [66]. While sheep farmers 
are now a minority of the population, norms derived from this practice 
remain embedded in Icelandic culture and continue to influence gov-
ernment decisions. Sheep farming practices continue to be largely car-
ried out as they have been for centuries [67]. 
Farmers in Freysnes and Svínafell own approximately 1100 sheep 
out of an estimated 4000 sheep in the district (RM.2; LI.12). In the 
mountainous areas of Öræfi, the sheep are gathered on foot. On Svína-
fellsheiði, a team covers the landscape in a coordinated manner to 
ensure that no sheep is overlooked. Interviewees recalled hauling sheep 
up cliffs with ropes (LI.10), going deep into glacial crevasses to search 
for sheep (LI.15), and herding sheep across glaciers (LI.1; LI.3; LI.11). On 
Svínafellsheiði, four to ten people gather the sheep in a single day. For 
the whole district, the gathering takes about eight full days with several 
additional days to locate any missing sheep (LI.10; see Fig. 5). 
The same people typically gather the sheep each year, with value 
placed on the skills and knowledge of veterans. Young or inexperienced 
Fig. 6. Town hall meeting about the fracture, Hof, October 24, 2018.  
3 In peak tourist season of early June 2018, rough estimates of daily exposure 
rates were as follows: 25 local and 55 non-local inhabitants in Freysnes (24 h), 4 
local inhabitants in two Svínafell farms (24 h), up to 200 tourists at the hotel 
(14 h), 50 glacier guides (5 h), 800 tourists on glacier walks (3 h), 1200 people 
predominantly tourists passing on the road (0.25 h) (S.4, LI.1, GG.3; [36]. When 
glacier operations were moved to another glacier after 22 June 2018, the rate of 
exposure for guides and glacier tourists decreased from several hours in 
high-risk areas on the glacier surface to approximately 15 min in lower-risk 
areas along the road. However, roughly 1500 people still spent some period 
of time in the exposed area on an average day during peak season. (RM.2). 
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people learn by listening to stories told by adults, and following their 
lead (LI.10; LI.12; LI.15). This acquisition of local knowledge resonates 
with Pálsson’s analysis of how Icelandic fisherman learn their trade, by 
actively engaging with their environment [73]. 
From the perspective of hazard identification, an important element 
is that people move through the landscape differently to when they hike 
or conduct other activities in the mountains. Sheep gathering requires 
that people cover the area extensively and move through terrain where 
they would not normally venture: 
It’s also a very different way of hiking the mountains when you’re 
sheep herding because you’re going to places where you would never 
have to go or you never think that you could go there. So you learn 
the to know the mountain in a very different way. (LI.10) 
For sheep herding, people go into places where nobody would dare to 
go because the sheep go crazy places. And people walk on a section 
with a drop of 200 m below and it’s like ‘yeah you just have to go 
there’. I think they’re also pretty proud of it. They’re like ‘yeah we 
went there, nobody goes there’. (LI.10) 
During and after the sheep gathering, people discuss how the gath-
ering was conducted, how the sheep reacted, and anything else note-
worthy (LI.13). This analysis is important for reviewing and updating 
the collective knowledge of local inhabitants. 
Another important factor is the frequency. One inhabitant emphas-
ised that “if you are just going once or twice in a lifetime you don’t have 
the same feeling for the land as a farmer that goes twice each year” 
(LI.11). In this way, local people develop a practical and intimate 
knowledge of the landscape that they continue to update and renego-
tiate each year. A French glacier guide compared the in-depth knowl-
edge Icelandic farmers have about the mountains to the situation in 
France: 
In Iceland the farmers do extensive farming with their sheep, so they 
have a better look at the mountains. Even though they don’t live in 
the mountains—they’re not there 24 hours a day—but they still go 
there. And they go everywhere, and they check and monitor their 
land. In Europe, there is nobody in the mountains, people just pass 
through the land. But if you don’t go every year to the same areas, 
then you will not notice the change. They are closer to their land 
here. (GG.8) 
In many ways the sheep gathering acts as an unofficial annual land 
survey conducted by people who have an intimate knowledge of the 
landscape. Typically this knowledge is not recorded but rather trans-
ferred from generation to generation orally and through the practice of 
sheep gathering. This unofficial survey has yielded important observa-
tions, including the discovery of the Svínafellsheiði fracture. 
5.2. Discovery of the fracture 
In 2014, farmers discovered the fracture in an area rarely visited 
except when gathering sheep. Based on local knowledge built up 
through sheep gathering, the farmers were aware that the fracture had 
not been there previously. None of the interviewees were surprised that 
farmers discovered the fracture when gathering sheep (LI.10; LI.12). 
Instead locals mentioned that “a farmer knows his land very well… they 
go year after year after year to the same places” (LI.13). 
Before the fracture was discovered, there was a dearth of human and 
financial investment in the study of large landslides in Iceland. This is 
likely to be common in cases where a country has had little or no past 
experience with a certain type of hazard. A risk manager reflected that in 
Iceland: 
we have been researching jökulhlaup [glacial floods] for decades, but 
landslides are something that we haven’t looked at much. If you go to 
the university here I guess you would easily find fifty or sixty people 
that have a good knowledge and have done some research in 
jökulhlaup, you probably find two or three that have done some real 
research on landslides (RM.2). 
Prior to the discovery of the fracture, there had been no country-wide 
assessment of landslide risks. Given the general lack of scientific 
research into large landslides around glaciers, the local knowledge 
gained through sheep gathering proved critical in the discovery of the 
hazard. Local people were well-positioned to identify this new type of 
hazard based on their in-depth understanding of the terrain and condi-
tions faced in the area. 
5.3. Warnings signs 
There is an expansive body of local knowledge in Öræfi about 
flooding triggered by Grímsvötn, which typically occurs every ten years. 
The short return period means that even young farmers have had first- 
hand experience of the floods (LI.12). Several interviewees recalled a 
farmer who could accurately predict glacial flooding in the 1960s, even 
when “scientists had no idea.” (LI.15). He would observe the 
Skeiðarárjökull outlet glacier every morning from his window, and take 
note of its position (LI.13). Over time he observed that the glacier would 
rise in relation to the mountain several days before a flood emerged 
(LI.10; LI.11). A local woman recalled that “he told me himself that you 
see over the glacier to the mountain, when he saw it rising he said now 
the river is preparing to come.” (LI.11). In this way, through regular 
monitoring and in-depth understanding of the surroundings developed 
over decades, he was able to predict flooding with a high degree of ac-
curacy. Other flood indicators included a change of colour of the river 
water (LI.16) and a sulphuric smell (LI.13). People could build up this 
detailed knowledge because the flooding “was so regular and you had 
multiple floods in one lifetime, so people got a chance to actually study 
it, understand it and build up some knowledge” (LI.10). One interviewee 
explained that “people studied that [the flooding of rivers] really closely 
because it really mattered for their wellbeing and lives” (LI.10), others 
mentioned cases in which people had to flee the floodplains for their 
lives (LI.15). 
In terms of Öræfajökull, interviewees indicated that an eruption 
would typically be preceded by a series of earthquakes and loud crack 
(LI.13). This has been supported by scientific investigation. Another 
warning sign was that silverware would become tarnished due to 
increased levels of sulphur in the air and water (LI.3; LI.11). In general, 
however, people noted that there were relatively few local stories and 
oral histories from the 1362 eruption with one woman reasoning that if 
“everyone died in the eruption, then if there were stories they wouldn’t 
have survived…they would have died with the people.” (LI.10). 
The extensive body of local knowledge about warning signs of 
Grímsvötn flooding contrasts to the lack of information on warning signs 
for a large landslide from Svínafellsheiði. Following the 2013 landslide 
onto Svínafellsjökull, many locals were not aware of the collapse until 
several days later when they noticed it by coincidence (LI.10; LI.13; 
LI.16). One woman explained that “people were driving by the glacier 
and were like ‘oh, there was a slide on it’” (LI.10). Only one local 
inhabitant interviewed was aware that something had happened at the 
time because his horses were distressed; he made the connection when 
he found out about the landslide days later (LI.11). A local glacier tour 
operator recalled that in the days before the landslide: 
there was very much rain and we cancelled tours. Then, when I came 
back, I didn’t notice that the slide had fallen. It was very cloudy and 
rainy. Luckily, because of the terrible rain, nobody was on the glacier 
when it fell. (LI.15) 
Based on this experience he reasoned that a large landslide resulting 
from the Svínafellsheiði fracture may be triggered by heavy rainfall 
(LI.15). Another local inhabitant believed that it would occur in early 
spring as the ground starts to thaw (LI.10), while a third mentioned that 
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if he saw the sheep coming down from the mountain in the middle of 
summer, he would take this as an indication that “something is 
happening up in the mountains [such as an eruption or a landslide], then 
it would be better for us to go away” (LI.11). In discussing warnings, one 
local inhabitant commented that someone in her family would receive a 
premonition of the landslide and pass on the warning to other people in 
the community (LI.10). Finally, some inhabitants believed that the 
landslide would occur without any warnings based on their experience 
with volcanic eruptions: “even though the volcanoes are watched and 
measured a lot, there are many eruptions that come like [finger click] 
always as a surprise” (LI.5). 
There was a high degree of uncertainty and a wide range of opinions 
expressed about when the fracture would collapse. One local inhabitant 
typified this doubt when she mentioned “we never know what’s going to 
happen and we don’t know if it’s going to fall down in ten years, 20 years 
or tomorrow” (LI.6). This understanding has been informed by scientific 
investigations which suggest that it could collapse with less than 60 s 
warning (LI.7). Interviewees often referred to scientific knowledge when 
discussing warning signs and the timing, indicating a greater depen-
dence on science for this type of hazard compared with other hazards in 
the area. 
Part of this lack of understanding of warning signs may stem from the 
novelty of this hazard, however it may also reflect the nature of large 
landslides. Carey et al. point out that the exact location and timing of 
slope failures are notoriously difficult to predict in any context [21]. 
Compared with warrning signs for eruptions and glacial flooding, 
\people had a much lower level of confidence about meteorological or 
other conditions that may act as a warning sign or increase the risk of a 
large landslide. Some interviewees, however, drew on their experience 
of smaller landslides and other hazards in the area, to speculate on 
factors that may increase the likelihood of collapse (LI.3; LI.15). 
In explaining the large body of local knowledge about Grímsvötn 
flooding, local inhabitants pointed to a number of factors including the 
short return period, the high potential danger, and the typically low 
mortality rate. The long return period of Öræfajökull eruptions and the 
high mortality rate of the 1362 eruption were associated with a lower 
level of local knowledge. The relative rarity of large landslides onto 
glaciers in Iceland and dearth of experience people have with this kind 
of hazard were understood to be key factors in the lack of local knowl-
edge on warning signs. 
5.4. Potential impact 
As with warning signs, the detailed local knowledge related to the 
likely effects of Grímsvötn flooding contrasted with the relative lack of 
knowledge about the potential effects of a large landslide triggered by 
the Svínafellsheiði fracture. All local inhabitants interviewed had a 
detailed understanding of the different paths of historic floods triggered 
by Grímsvötn. The floods of 1913 and 1921, for example, were 
remembered to be particularly destructive for farming land (LI.11). The 
location of houses in Svínafell, traditionally built part-way up the slope, 
reflected these flood paths. Over the past hundred years, man-made 
flood barriers and dykes have been erected to alter the direction and 
intensity of these floods. In response, people have shifted several houses 
in Svínafell further downhill to flatter and more fertile areas (LI.16). 
However, some of these buildings are now potentially exposed to runout 
from a large landslide triggered by the Svínafellsheiði fracture. 
An understanding of the areas that will be affected by a collapse of 
Svínafellsheiði fracture, and specifically whether the runout will affect 
Freysnes or if the settlement will be protected by the terminal moraine, 
has been contested between scientific and local knowledge. Scientists 
and risk managers interviewed between October 2018 and January 
2019, predicted that Freysnes would be affected directly, cautioning that 
the land/ice/water/air slurry may become airborne after reaching the 
terminal moraine, with catastrophic results for Freysnes (RM.2, S.1, 
S.2). When presented to the local community in a formal public briefing, 
this interpretation was questioned by several locals during question time 
and in open discussions afterwards (attended by first author, October 24, 
2018). Drawing on their experience with glacial floods, several locals 
maintained that the runout would follow the path of the rivers on either 
side on Freysnes rather than affecting the settlement itself (LI.2., LI.5.). 
“With floods caused by the glacier, the runoff has always come down 
these two rivers”, one local reasoned, “why would this be any different?” 
(Informal discussion, October 24, 2018). 
Updated scientific modelling conducted in mid-2019 suggested that 
the runout would likely follow the existing flood patterns and avoid 
Freysnes. Scientists predict, however, that the runout will be more likely 
to affect Freysnes as the volume in the proglacial lake increases (S.4). 
Even after the presentation of this updated modelling, some local in-
habitants remained uncertain about the runout zone: “they believe that 
the moraine will be a shelter that divides the flood but we do not know 
how much flood will come, how much water. Maybe it won’t just flood, 
maybe it will jump [due to the terminal moraine as first predicted by 
scientists]” (LI.12). Another interviewee added, “I hope so but you never 
know. It’s really hard to calculate these things.” (LI.12). 
Even though people in the area have not faced a large landslide onto 
a glacier anywhere close to this size, they drew on typical impact pat-
terns from other flooding hazards in an attempt to deduce potential ef-
fects. While local knowledge based on lessons learnt from glacial floods 
was ultimately supported by scientific investigation, these two forms of 
knowledge could have continued to run counter to each other. 
5.5. Response 
No large landslides have affected people or infrastructure in Öræfi. 
As a result, there are no stories of effective or ineffective responses for 
this specific type of hazard. This contrasts to the flooding from 
Grímsvötn. While flooding has not typically led to fatalities, people told 
many stories of survival and near-miss responses. These oral histories 
included stories of people collecting bird-eggs on nearby cliffs who were 
saved by people riding to warn them of an imminent flood. Other heroic 
stories involved people rowing into the floodwaters to rescue sheep 
(LI.15). Many interviewees also recalled stories of daring river crossings, 
with knowledge about how to cross rivers safely passed down through 
families (LI.11). 
In general, there was a high degree of uncertainty about how people 
should respond to a large landslide caused by the fracture, including 
what is the safest places to take shelter. After attending public hazard 
briefings one local woman mentioned that she started to reconsider her 
previous plan of taking shelter in the basement of a nearby house, as 
scientists predicted that the house would be overrun by the landslide 
(LI.1.). She was left not knowing the safest way to react. Compared with 
other types of hazards experienced in the area, people did not have a 
clear idea of how to respond in the case of a large landslide, or the most 
effective survival strategies to follow. 
5.6. DRRM processes 
This study found that Icelandic authorities typically engaged and 
involved local communities in DRRM planning and preparedness ac-
tivities for the Svínafellsheiði fracture. Based on their study of the DRRM 
response to warning signs of a potential eruption from Katla in 2006, 
Bird et al. determined that this participatory focus developed as a result 
of local inhabitants—especially those with local knowledge—rejecting 
top-down disaster management approaches [31]. 
Public hazard briefings represent a key forum whereby DRRM au-
thorities drew on knowledge and experience of local inhabitants about 
the Svínafellsheiði fracture and surrounding area, to inform the devel-
opment of DRRM plans (RM.2, RM.3; see Fig. 6). Bird et al. similarly 
identified public meetings as a forum where trust was developed be-
tween the locals and DRRM authorities in volcano risk management 
processes [69]. Planning workshops conducted in October 2018 by the 
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DRRM authorities with locals directly exposed to the Svínafellsheiði 
fracture, were interactive and involved frank discussion among partic-
ipants. Local residents expressed their appreciation of the generally in-
clusive approach by authorities, with one local inhabitant reflecting that 
the authorities were “ready to listen to the people who live here.” 
(LI.15). 
There were several examples in which DRRM authorities and scien-
tists were able to draw on local knowledge to improve their under-
standing of the hazard or the planned response. For example, one 
attendee remembered: 
In the last meeting, when they were presenting their findings, they 
showed some pictures that they took that morning from a plane. I 
think they said ‘we think there is a new fracture here in Hafrafell’ 
[next mountain west of Svínafellsheiði]. And then a farmer, said ‘no, 
no, that is not a fracture, it is a sheep path. I always walk this path 
when I’m sheep herding.’ And they said ‘thank you for telling us so 
we don’t have to hike up to find out that this is a path from the sheep 
not a new crack.’ So that is an example of knowledge that farmers 
could add to the scientists. (LI.10) 
The disaster management briefings mobilised the participation of the 
local population and played an important role in the exchange of in-
formation between the local community and authorities engaged in 
DRRM. While local inhabitants were typically involved in DRRM plan-
ning and preparedness, there were still areas of contention where local 
people did not feel that their voices were heard, including one DRRM 
decision that interviewees described as “a mistake” (LI.15). The main 
topics of contention involved specific policies, including the decision to 
limit access to the glacier for some activities but not restrict access 
entirely, and the decision to implement a no-build zone in the areas 
exposed to the fracture (LI.15). The effects of these decisions on the local 
community and their coping mechanisms warrant further investigation 
but lie beyond the scope of this article. Several interviewees were also 
frustrated that DRRM authorities did not always respect pre-arranged 
timeframes. For example one woman noted that “last autumn they 
said we would get answers in springtime, and now it is July and I think 
springtime is over. Maybe they are going to wait until the monitoring 
has been conducted for one year and I think that is in September or 
October, but why are they promising us springtime if it’s not true.” 
(LI.1). Such statements suggest that lapsed deadlines eroded local trust 
in the process. However, overall what emerges is a broadly participatory 
approach to DRRM in which authorities and scientists value, and draw 
on the knowledge of local inhabitants. That said, while local knowledge 
is taken into account, scientific knowledge still tended to be given 
greater weight for example in determining runout zones. 
6. Conclusion 
There is consensus in the DRRM literature about the importance of 
incorporating local knowledge [16,17]. With climate change, new haz-
ards are increasingly emerging in areas where they were previously 
unknown. Building a better understanding of the role of local knowledge 
in DRRM in the context of emerging hazards is paramount. This 
ethnographic investigation of the Svínafellsheiði fracture helps illustrate 
how local knowledge has informed DRRM processes for a large landslide 
onto a glacier, a type of hazard that has not previously affected people or 
infrastructure in Iceland. 
The case of the Svínafellsheiði fracture demonstrates how local 
knowledge can be instrumental in the discovery of emerging hazards. In 
the Öræfi district, local inhabitants develop skills and in-depth knowl-
edge of the terrain through sheep gathering practices which, in many 
ways, acts as an unofficial annual land survey conducted by people who 
have an intimate knowledge of the landscape. Local people, especially 
those with customary practices of natural resource management, are 
often well positioned to identify changes in the terrain and conditions 
based on their in-depth understanding of their local area. This can be 
particularly important in the case of new hazards where large-scale 
funding for scientific research into a particular hazard is not yet avail-
able. The important role of local knowledge in discovering new types of 
hazards may be relevant to a range of slowly-emerging climate change- 
related hazards including floods, landslides, rising sea levels. The po-
tential of local knowledge could be further capitalised upon in Öræfi and 
elsewhere, if inhabitants were engaged systematically through citizen 
science initiatives incorporated into formal DRRM processes. This rep-
resents an avenue for further investigation. 
In terms of warning signs, potential impact and response, we found 
there was an extensive body of local knowledge pertaining to flooding 
from Grímsvötn, and, to a lesser extent, eruptions of Öræfajökull. 
Comments from local people suggest that there was a greater volume of 
hazard-specific local knowledge when a hazard had a relatively short 
return period, such as flooding from Grímsvötn, enabling people to make 
observations and test theories several times within a lifetime. A small 
number of local inhabitants attempted to draw lessons learnt from other 
types of hazards to better understand the warning signs and potential 
impact of Svínafellsheiði fracture, with varying success. Meanwhile, 
local knowledge of other hazards provided little guidance on how to 
respond in the case of a large landslide. These findings suggest that while 
it is important to draw on local knowledge, it may be less directly 
applicable for understanding the predicted impact and effective 
response strategies for new hazards. 
Finally, this study found that local knowledge is not just relevant to 
DRRM processes in less developed and developing countries. McWilliam 
et al. argue that “local knowledge for DRR is particularly important in 
countries where government capabilities are limited.” [68: 1]. This has 
been confirmed through a large body of scholarship. However, this case 
adds support to the contention that local knowledge is also important in 
countries with well-established and well-funded DRRM processes. Even 
in highly developed countries, implementing effective DRRM strategies 
requires an integrated approach that involves local inhabitants, scien-
tists and DRRM authorities, bringing together the knowledge of all three 
groups. 
Funding 
This work was kindly supported by the Doctoral Grants of the Uni-
versity of Iceland Research Fund (Rannsóknasjóður Háskóla Íslands), 
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Pedersen, F. Pálsson, S. Guðmundsson, H. Geirsson, Risk of major rock slope failure 
at the Svínafellsheiði mountain, SE Iceland, Geophys. Res. Abstr. 21 (2019) 
EGU2019. 
[2] Icelandic Meteorological Office, Fractures in Svínafellsheiði and a Potential 
Rockslide on Svínafellsjökull, 2018 a, 22 June, Retrieved from: https://en.vedur. 
is/about-imo/news/fractures-in-svinafellsheidi-and-a-potential-rockslide-on-svin 
afellsjokull. (Accessed 9 October 2018). 
[3] O. Sigurðsson, G. Sigurðsson, B. Björnsson, E. Pagneux, S. Zóphóníasson, 
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floods in Iceland: An assessment of hazards and risks at Öræfajökull and on the 
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